1. There are, to be sure, other ways to make a case for the Jewishness of Mahler’s music, ways that already have some currency and may be extended easily enough. It has been pointed out, for example, how different Mahler’s version of Christianity is from Catholicism or any other widely accepted version of Christianity. Thus, his “Resurrection” Symphony places much more emphasis on heavenly grace and forgiveness than anything one is likely to hear in a church, deftly putting aside the very idea of judgment even though what is ostensibly being redeemed, according to earlier movements, is the soul of a rather self-centered suicide victim who was probably also an unrepentant adulterer.30 We may note, as well, the rather bizarre way that his Third Symphony seeks to “derive” Christianity through a process of evolution within an idiosyncratic version of the cosmos, transporting us from inanimate nature, through flowers, creatures of the forest, and even Nietzsche, before supplanting it all with another singularly non-judgmental version of heavenly grace. And if one listens carefully to the words in the finale of the Fourth Symphony—a movement he at one point subtitled “Heavenly Life,” and which presents a child’s view of heaven in the style of a lullaby—one notices that even Herod is apparently redeemed in this supposedly Christian heaven. Moreover, his redemption does not seem even to involve reform, let alone contrition, as he stands cheerfully ready to slaughter the Lamb—which can only represent either Christ or the countless children that the historical Herod slaughtered, and which is led in by no less than John the Baptist, another of Herod’s victims. Yet, however strange these highly individual takes on Christianity may be, it is hard to see them as particularly Jewish, particularly as an aggregate, except perhaps in their generalized rejection of Christian orthodoxy. And it seems particularly odd to find Mahler setting—in the finale of the Fourth Symphony, the first major work he composed after his return to Vienna—a text that reads, “We lead a meek, innocent, little lamb to its death!” (original)—just as if the blood libel and the charge of being Christ-killers were by then a thing of the past.

  2. What may work better here, if we want to get at Louis’s claim that Mahler “spoke musical German with an accent,” that his music “acts Jewish,” is for us to think briefly about the model of language, and about what typically happens when a great writer writes in a language not his or her own. For instance, we may consider Nabokov, whose mastery of English was of the highest order, but who wrote like no native speaker would. What matters here is a sense of being inside or outside the language; a strong writer will always have an individual voice, but if she or he is a native speaker, there will usually be some sense of familiarity as well. With Nabokov, though, there are always going to be moments when you realize that his experience of English is different from yours, that his engagement with the language is that of an outsider, however well he has mastered it, however much he seems to love its sound, its nuances, and what it can do for him. Word choice will suddenly seem to have the subtlety and strangeness of a butterfly looked at from up close, and your own language will seem for a moment foreign to you.31 So, too, might Mahler’s music sometimes seem Germanic without seeming precisely German. One way it might do so is through the exaggerated nuances of his orchestration. Another might be the frequent and unsettling shifts, as if the music can’t seem to steer as straight a course, or maintain the same sense of musical flow, as a symphony from another, more “German” composer—and here, we might remember Bernstein’s identification of a neurotic element in Mahler’s music. These things, indeed, could easily have been what Louis meant when he wrote that Mahler’s music exhibited the “gestures of an Eastern, all too Eastern Jew,” especially when we remember that Mahler’s conducting—particularly his conducting of Beethoven, and most particularly of Beethoven’s Ninth—was criticized for a similar kind of “Jewish” gesturing, both in the fussiness of the sound itself and in his elaborately gestural manner on the podium, which was much discussed and even caricatured in the press (see Figure 2).32 (And here, again, we might think of Leonard Bernstein for a more modern example of something similar—and someone similarly vilified in the press.)

    Figure 2: Mahler Conducting, Silhouettes by Otto Bohler


  3. But the most fruitful way to get at the question of Mahler’s musical Jewishness is surely to consider more specifically the nature and perception of German music in the late nineteenth century—the ideal that Louis claimed Mahler’s music did not attain—and then to examine instances when Mahler engages directly with that ideal. What emerges when we look from this vantage point at the wide variety of situations that Mahler creates in his music, is that he sometimes speaks fluent musical German—from the inside, as it were—but also at times presents a distorted version of that ideal, one whose oppressiveness is staunchly resisted. We find in these two types of situation the essence of what it meant to Mahler to be a Jewish composer within late-nineteenth-century Germanic musical culture. German music was at that time self-consciously the most elevated music, intellectually and spiritually demanding, with an unrivaled capacity for powerful and exalted expression. Whether or not one agreed with the German philosophers who claimed that music was the highest of the arts—implicitly, of course, they meant German music, which was to say, music at its best—musical German was eminently a language worth mastering. Yet the elevation of music to this position in Germanic culture involved a strong component of oppression, and was inflected by a correspondingly strong dose of German nationalist feeling. German music was elevated—and many were quite explicit about this in the generation following Beethoven—because Germans were more capable than others of this kind of profound engagement with what was claimed to be the highest of the arts, and less disposed towards the kind of frivolousness one found, say, in Italian music (Pederson 87–107). Listening to Beethoven and Bach was good for you; it made you better Germans. And we may well note that this rather oppressive attitude, passionately fostered throughout the nineteenth century as an essential component of German nationalism, is still very much with us in the exaggerated reverence we are taught to bring to the concert hall, except now we pretend it’s a universal language, so we drop the “German;” now we say: listening to serious music—such as Bach and Beethoven—is good for us; it makes us better people. In this way was born the myth of musical transcendence, that German art music—the musical “mainstream”—was universal and culturally uninflected, a myth that has occupied the background for most attempts to identify Jewishness (or Czechness, or Russianness, or any other implicitly marginalized ethnicity) in music.

  4. Americans, especially, have long had something like Mahler’s ambivalence regarding what we now call “classical” music (which is mostly German, or German-derived, but no longer exclusively German); for us, though, “popular” musics (jazz, rock, Broadway, whatever) serve as the less serious alternative. Broadly speaking, as a culture, we tend to have something like reverence for the classical tradition—although this is less and less true—but feel more at ease with some flavor of popular music, which is another way of saying that, while we revere classical music, we are also oppressed by it. And we can find ready examples of this kind of ambivalence, with “popular” musicians such as Duke Ellington and more recently Paul McCartney aspiring to write for the concert
    Ex. 12: The Beatles,
    “Eleanor Rigby”

    © 1966 Parlophone CDP 7 46441 2
    Ex. 13: The Beatles,
    “Eleanor Rigby”

    © 1966 Parlophone CDP 7 46441 2
    hall, but also using “classical” music as a point of reference—what musicologists like to call a “topic”—for something much less positive. An early and well-known example of this use of a classical-music “topic” from McCartney is the 1966 Beatles song “Eleanor Rigby,” which is dominated by the sound of closely miked lower strings playing in an agitated minor mode and in a contrapuntal texture evocative of Baroque music (not a sound typically used in popular music before this song); this is “classical” music at its most severe, emerging most prominently during the opening and recurring phrase, “Ah, look at all the lonely people,” which seems almost to point to this music (hear Ex. 12). Here, a referential version of “classical” music serves to represent a kind of alienation, a sense of lonely isolation; notice, for example, how little heed this relentless churning motion pays to the sympathetic vocals, which seem powerless to actually connect with the lonely people, forever trapped within the unstoppable flow of their empty busy-ness. Later, in the verse about Father McKenzie—it was originally going to be Father McCartney, but that’s another story, and much too Freudian for us to get into here—the theme of failed communication leading to alienation is made particularly clear, as we find Father McKenzie “writing the words of a sermon that no-one will hear” (hear Ex. 13).33

  5. Intriguingly, Mahler also wrote a song about a preacher whose sermons are not heard, and used a very similar technique. In Mahler’s “St. Anthony of Padua’s Fish-Sermon,” based on a folk poem from Des knaben Wunderhorn, St. Anthony leaves his empty church to preach to the fishes, who listen attentively, are most appreciative, and then go back to business as usual. In an explanation of the song, Mahler declared this to be a satire on humanity that he believed “only a few people will understand,”34 and he’s probably right. Most hear it as a satire on the way typical congregations listen appreciatively, but then return to their lives as if nothing has happened. But the song probes deeper than this, as Mahler indicates, for it also satirizes St. Anthony himself, who seems quite as content to have a congregation of appreciative, uncomprehending fish as he would have been had real people come to his church. And it satirizes the smug complacency with which we—that is, humanity at large—go through the motions of communication without anything whatever actually being communicated, beyond the roles themselves, of preacher and preached-to, etc. Thus, we are implicitly told, we have roles to play in relation to each other, but they are empty, without real content, and we don’t ever really connect—just as, in “Eleanor Rigby,” the sad inflections of the voice observe empathetically, but cannot reach “all the lonely people.” In Mahler’s “Fish-Sermon,” he sets the swimming motion of the fish in the orchestra, with the dry voice and manner of St. Anthony set in the angular vocal melody; in one deliciously grotesque passage for the E-flat Clarinet, we even hear the sermon as the fish must hear it, in Mahler’s words, “translated into their thoroughly tipsy-sounding language” (see endnote 34) (hear Ex. 14).

    Ex. 14: Mahler, "St. Anthony of Padua's Fish Sermon"
    from Des knaben Wunderhorn

    New York Philharmonic Orchestra, Leonard Bernstein
    © 1993 Sony Classical SMK 47590
  6. Even before he completed the song, Mahler started working on a more elaborate symphonic version, which eventually took its place as the third movement—the Scherzo—of his Second Symphony (the “Resurrection”). Here, the theme of alienation is even more relentlessly pursued, and the effect reaches beyond satire to genuine pathos. On the three occasions that Mahler provided an account of this movement, he describes the empty, bustling activity of life in various ways, with the first account being the most elaborate:

    When you wake out of this sad dream, and must re-enter life, confused as it is, it happens easily that this always-stirring, never-resting, never-comprehensible pushing that is life becomes horrible to you, like the motion of dancing figures in a brightly-lit ballroom, into which you are peering from outside, in the dark night—from such a distance that you can not hear the music they dance to! Then life seems meaningless to you, like a horrible chimera, that you wrench yourself out of with a horrible cry of disgust. (Abbate 124, her emphasis removed, Mahler’s restored; original)35

    The second and third movements are episodes from the life of the fallen hero. The Andante tells of his love. What I have expressed in the Scherzo I can only visualize as follows: when one watches a dance from a distance, without hearing the music, the revolving motions of the partners seem absurd and pointless because the key element, the rhythm, is lacking. Likewise, to someone who has lost himself and his happiness, the world seems distorted and mad, as if reflected in a concave mirror. The Scherzo ends with the appalling shriek of this tortured soul. (Bauer-Lechner 784–5; original)

    The spirit of disbelief and negation has seized him. He is bewildered by the flood of apparitions and he loses his perception of childhood and the profound strength that love alone can give. He despairs both of himself and of God. The world and life begin to seem unreal. Utter disgust for all being and becoming seizes him in an iron grasp, torments him until he utters a cry of despair. (Alma Mahler, Erinnerungen und Briefe 268; and La Grange, Mahler 785; original)
    In the first of these, the hero wakes from a “sad dream [the second movement], and must re-enter life, confused as it is, … an always-stirring, never-resting, never-comprehensible pushing that … becomes horrible, … like the motion of dancing figures in a brightly-lit ballroom.” While Mahler eventually drops the analogy to dancers dancing to unheard music, he consistently describes the effect as of something missing, something vitally important, something that might give meaning to life—the music, we might say, that ought to direct and accompany the “dancing figures” of living humanity; thus, in the second description, he continues, “likewise, to someone who has lost himself and his happiness, the world seems distorted and mad, as if reflected in a concave mirror,” and, in the third, “bewildered by the flood of apparitions … he loses his perception of childhood and the profound strength that love alone can give—he despairs both of himself and of God.” In all three descriptions, the horror finally proves too much, and the hero’s outraged revulsion leads him to utter “a horrible cry of disgust,” “a cry of despair,” “the appalling shriek of [a] tortured soul.”

  7. About the specific source for the overall scenario of his Second Symphony, Mahler was a little vague, perhaps because his apparent literary source, at least in the first movement, hit too close to home in its depiction of an adulterous relationship. Bernstein’s universalized—perhaps also more humanistic—reading of the symphony finds it a work that expresses the resurrective capacity of the human spirit, with a specific focus on the living that Bernstein insisted on even when he played the work after Kennedy’s assassination. But the most plausible programmatic explanation for the work, one that accounts more honestly for what Mahler had to say about it, and for what it actually does as a piece of music involved with a particular programmatic trope, is one that recounts the anguish of a soul caught between Heaven and Hell, forced to wander the earth because his business among the living is not yet finished, who recounts and relives traumatic events in his life, revisiting what led him to suicide in the first movement, dreaming of a lost love in the second, and recoiling in disgust in the Scherzo, when, from the vantage point of a soul whose body no longer lives, he contemplates the empty pursuits of the living world (Hefling, “Mahler’s ‘Todtenfeier’”). In the end, in the “Resurrection” finale, the wandering soul enters Heaven and is forgiven. This overall scenario explains more specifically why, in the Scherzo, the “hero” cannot “hear the music” that the living “dance to.” And, more broadly, it bears an uncanny resemblance to the perspective of a Jew—more precisely, of Mahler himself—caught between two worlds, unable to leave the one behind, incapable of fully embracing the other in part because he fears he will not be welcome, and so is forced to wander the world without a home of his own, disgusted by the emptiness he sees around him. Moreover, it captures, in its projected suicide and its despairing aftermath, the predicament of a Jew who has renounced Judaism but has not received a Christian welcome (although, again, we may note that the work predates Mahler’s own conversion by several years). And, sadly, we can see more clearly why the resurrection Mahler details in the finale proves unexpectedly forgiving and non-judgmental; in the alternative world that Mahler creates for himself in the Second Symphony, the penitent is offered a blanket forgiveness, one that might absolve, as we may assume, even the most grievous “sin” of being born a Jew.

  8. The basic material for the Scherzo, as adapted from the “Fish-Sermon” song, is manipulated so as to create the effect of something self-generating, something all embracing, more than a little seductive, but also repellent and oppressive; it is in effect a parody of Germanic, “absolute” music, with all the seemingly autonomous flow requisite of that tradition supporting a grotesquely rendered musical surface. It is important to underscore here that what nineteenth-century Germans were successfully marketing as the central, most distinctive characteristic of their music was coextensive with the neutral, supposedly universalized designation of “absolute” music.36 Thus, as part of the background for both this particular parodistic presentation and Louis’s disparaging claims against Mahler’s music, we must note that the standard to which Mahler was once found wanting, or tainted, stands as the pure, essentialized core of “good” music, while at the same time remaining deeply inflected with a German-nationalist sensibility. Through this marriage and the particularities of the tradition itself, a sense of autonomous flow is both the great strength of the German “absolute music” tradition and the source of its oppressiveness. If you are in alignment with that flow, you are empowered by it; if you are outside, it seems oblivious, self-contained, and more than a little threatening, for it runs over everything, absorbs everything and seems irresistible in its force. It was this capacity of Mahler’s parodistic Scherzo, to absorb anything and everything that comes under its gravitational pull, that Luciano Berio exploited in the version of the movement that he presents in his 1968 Sinfonia (honoring not only Martin Luther King, but also Leonard Bernstein, who so often performed the “Resurrection” Symphony); in Berio’s version a bewildering amount of verbal and quoted musical material appears and disappears within its myriad currents and eddies (hear Ex. 15).37

  9. A reading of Mahler’s Scherzo along these lines produces a scenario that may stand equally well for what Mahler describes in his three accounts of the movement, in the first instance; for Mahler’s situation as a Jew within Germanic culture in the second; and, in the third, for Mahler’s ambivalent attitude toward German music, which here is presented as autonomous and even a little seductive in its on-going perpetual motion—acting something like the hypnotist’s twirling sphere or methodically oscillating pendulum—but made repellent through the banality of its material and its occasional flights into grotesquerie. The dramatic trajectory falls roughly into three parts: 1) the near-seduction by what we might call the “absolute music” topic; 2) the attempted (but unsuccessful) escape from its absolutist flow, and; 3) the ultimate rejection of the “absolute music” topic through a purging orchestral scream.

  10. Ex. 16: Mahler, end of Symphony II, mvt. 2 through beginning of mvt. 3

    Chicago Symphony Orchestra,
    Sir Georg Solti
    © 1984 Decca 430 805-2
    Ex. 17: Mahler, Symphony II,
    mvt. 3

    Chicago Symphony Orchestra,
    Sir Georg Solti
    © 1984 Decca 430 805-2
    The movement begins with a wake-up gesture, which is not in the song, a gesture that establishes the impulse and musical motive that will seem to generate the perpetual-motion material that thereafter dominates the movement, material that seemed in the song to represent the swimming motion of the fish. This opening gesture also marks that material as an intruder, establishing from the beginning of the movement an outsider’s perspective on its “absolutist” flow. In this first section, we hear both prominent tokens of satire (the grotesque E-flat-clarinet figure), and a striking demonstration of the absorptive capacity of absolute music, when the vocal melody finally shows up and, instead of dominating as in the song, is not even allowed to finish its phrase before simply being absorbed into the musical flow. This is the kind of absorption that will be resisted by the subjective center of the movement—the tortured soul, Mahler’s Jewishness, whatever we may take that center to be (hear Ex. 16). In the next part of the movement, the first attempt at seduction, a suave dance-like music is suddenly resisted at the end of the passage, just before a return to the original material (hear Ex. 17).

  11. Now comes a kind of dialogue, in which Mahler first presents an intensification of the “absolute music” topic—involving fugal processes and the addition of a counter-melody along the way—followed by a violent resistance, much louder than the “absolute music” material and in a different key. This pattern happens twice, that is, with two fugal passages followed each time by violent resistance. Then, with the second violent passage comes part two of the scenario sketched above: the apparent escape, which is into a world fairly dripping with nostalgia, an evocation of small-town rusticity, with the trumpet choir playing with their bells up in the air and with exaggerated expressiveness. Harps accompany the trumpet choir, adding a sense of comforting benediction, punctuated by occasional bird-like trills. Almost unnoticed, though, the “absolute music” topic sneaks back in during the later stages, signaling that the escape is only apparent, another dream world from which we must awake (hear Ex. 18).

  12. Ex. 18: Mahler, Symphony II,
    mvt. 3

    Chicago Symphony Orchestra,
    Sir Georg Solti
    © 1984 Decca 430 805-2
    Ex. 19: Mahler, Symphony II,
    mvt. 3

    Chicago Symphony Orchestra,
    Sir Georg Solti
    © 1984 Decca 430 805-2
    The final subjective response to the “absolute music” topic comes in the later stages of the movement. Once again, the violent resistance follows on the heels of the dance-like episode, but this time the resistance is more forceful and definitive, culminating in a ferocious “scream.” What happens after the scream is especially noteworthy. Once again we seem to have opened before us a subjective space where the “absolute music” topic doesn’t intrude, but this time it is no nostalgic escape into the past, since we can still hear the “absolute music” topic churning away underneath it all. Now the oppressor is in the background; the subjective surface seems to have wrenched itself away from its influence (hear Ex. 19). In musical terms—and also in cultural terms—something important is represented by the emetic purge of the orchestral scream. The scream articulates with uncompromising force an irrevocable gesture of denial, of refusing to take part. Thus, there remain no indicators of subjective dismay in the fairly brief concluding section of the movement, only a sense of psychic detachment, and of waiting.


  13. But even here there is ambivalence, for the direction the symphony as a whole points to is diametrically opposed to the orientation of the musical and cultural markers in this movement. Within the program of the symphony, the haunted subjectivity of the Scherzo that rejects the empty bustle of living humanity is immediately displaced in the calm opening of the next movement by a much less troubled subjectivity, through the sound of a human voice entering without instrumental accompaniment, seeking and eventually finding Christian redemption. How evocative, in this context, is the grotesque bustle of the Scherzo of those streets in New York, whose chaotic Jewishness Mahler was to reject some years later? And yet—on the other hand—how much more vital is a reading that focuses on the act of a resisting outsider fighting against the tide of absorption into the dominant flow of a hostile culture? Isn’t that the essence of being Jewish in the German lands at the turn of the century?

1    2    3   4    5    Works Cited   Endnotes    Next


Top of Page Table of Contents Click to email ECHO




Articles

Kassabian:
Ubiquitous Listening

Draughon and Knapp:
Mahler and the Crisis of Jewish Identity

Roundtable
Photo Essay

Masson:
Review Essay

Kopplin:
Allen Forte

Reviews